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CONTRACTS OF INFANTS, MARRIED WOMEN AND LUNATICS.

The object of this paper is to examine how far the defence
to a bill for specific performance of want of mutuality has.
been or can be applied to cases where the plaintiff is either an
'infant, a married woman, or a lunatic. We will deal with each separately, and first with those cases in which the bill
is brought by an infant. - I have already pointed out that
the first clear application of the defence of want of mutuality
in the remedy to a bill for specific performance occurred in
the English case of Flighty. Bollard, decided in 1828.2 The
plaintiff in that case was an infant. As they could not decree
specific performance against the infant, the court held that
'The other papers will be found 49 A. L. R. pp. 270, 382, 445, 507,
559, and Vol. 50, p. 65.
"24 Rus. 298; 49

'A.

M. L. 27o.

For an explanation of the case of

Clayton v. Ashdown, 9 Vin. Abr. 393 (1710), which is sometimes cited
as a case involving specific performance against an infant, see 49 A. L.
R. 271.
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they would not grant it in his favor.3 In a receht case in
Colorado, Seaton v. Tohill,4 the court, without reference to
the doctrine of want of mutuality in the remedy, refused to
admit the plea of the plaintiff's infancy, saying that this
would be "permitting the adult party to directly reap .the
benefit from the infancy of the contracting party." This is
the only American case I have seen. From it we may infer
that, in the United States, the ability of a defendant to resist
specific performance on the sole ground of the infancy of the.
plaintiff and the consequent lack of mutuality in the
remedy is an open question. The position of the Colorado
court amounts to this: That the tendency of the law to
protect an infant and to prevent others from taking advantage of the infancy, is stronger than the policy which requires
mutuality in the remedy.5
A contract of a married woman, on which she can sue or be
sued at law, she can in equity be decreed to perform to the
same extent as if she were unmarried. 6 Therefore, when amarried woman seeks to enforce a contract made with her,
the question before the court is not whether the remedy is
mutual. In such cases the real question is the existence or
non-existence of a valid contract. I The idea of more than
one court in cases involving the enforcement of contracts of
married women, that the question before them was one
involving mutuality, has led to a good deal of confusion of
'See further, Lumley v. Ravenscroft, L. R. i Q. B. 683 "(195).

'53 P. 170 (i898).

-

In a final paper of this series I hope to deal with the value of the rule
requiring mutuality in the remedy.
'This statement is apparently a necessary inference from the language of the statutes enabling married women to contract: KIlecka v.
Ziegler, 32 A. 24i, Md. (i895).
See also' Young v. Young,
45 N- J. Eq. 27 (889), 41; sed quare Chamberlin v. Robertson,
.31 Ia.. 4o8 (1871); see infra, note x7. There is also an Irish
casi, Fennelly v. Anderson, i Ir. Ch. 7o6 (I85I), 71:2, which may be
regarded as throwing some doubt on the assumption. There a husband
and wife agreed to sell certain household interests of the wife. It
appears that the woman might have rendered the contract binding on
her by acknowledging it under .the statute of 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 92;
but it is to be presumed that she did not do so. The court seem to admit
that the woman is not bound, and could not be made to convey, pp. 71o,
712, yet they grant specific performance. Compare argument of Ambler
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language. Thus in Richards v. Green7 the court had-under
consideration a contract by a married -woman to purchase
land and give a bond and mortgage as part payment. The,
married woman had no separate property. The contract as
an executory. contract was void. There would, therefore,
seem to be no question of the plaintiff's inability to secure a
conveyance." The. court, however, discussed lack of mutuality in the remedy, citing the case of the infant plaintiff,
Flight v. Bolland.9 Similar confusion appears in the language of the Supreme Courts of at least two, other states.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court say, in reply to the defence
of want of mutuality, in a suit involving a contract by a mar-1
tied woman to purchase real property, that the defence' i
does not *apply where the "one under legal disability has
performed."' 10 Now the woman in the case in question had'
merely'tendered the purchase price.. If the contract of the
in Daniel v. Adams, Ambler, 495 (i765), 497- The actual decision can
"be supported on the theory that the contract was with the husband, and
that prior to filing the bill he had offered a good conveyance: see infra,
P. 255. This last idea seems to be in the, mind,'of the court; note. the
language and case cited p. 710. In Pennsylvania, under the Act of .3,
P. L. 344, there was a difference of opinion as to whether the contract
for the sale of her land by a married woman had to be separately
acknowledged by her, but no doubt as to the power of a court of equity
to decree specific performance if the contract was properly entered into.
Compare Reed's Est., 3 Pa. D. R. 5o3 (1893), with Wertlinger v. Jack,
16 Pa. C. C. 112 (x895). The Act of igoi, P. L. 67, expressly does away
with the necessity for a separate acknowledgement.
123 N. J. Eq. 536 (1872).
A married woman's power to contract in
New Jersey is confined to contracts relating to her separate property:
Gen. Stats. N. J. (1895), p. 2014. In Richards v. Green the one hundred
dollars paid by the wife in signing the contract, and the five hundred dollars tendered subsequently, was the property of the husband: see p. 538.
"Richards v. Green was ultimately decided against- the defendant on
the ground that there was a binding contract between him and the
husband.
'In the case before the court there was of course in a possible sense
want of mutuality in the remedy, i. e., the same want of mutuality which
exists in every case of an agreement between two or more persons which
is not the source of legal obligations on either party.
"' Yerkes v. Richards, 153 Pa. 646 (1893), 630. The case was not
brought for the specific performance of the contract, but was a suit for
damages for the breach of the contract.
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married woman had been void, the mere offer on her part to
perform it would not have made it a-good contract. In
Pennsylvania, however, a married woman, though she has,
no separate property, can bind herself by an executory contract to purchase real propertyj I Her mere willingne.s to
perform, therefore, did not remove an existing disability or
make the remedy mutual. The mutuality of the obligation
and remedy existed from the inception of the contract. In
a Missouri case, Warren v. Costetto,12 a married woman was
in possession of land under a lease. The lessor, after the
lease was executed and when the woman was in possession,
gave her a bond conditioned to convey the land.'3 There
was no consideration for the bond, and formal contracts are:
abolished in the state by statute.14 The lessor died. The
woman offered to pay his widow the c6nsideration for the
conveyance designated in the bond, and on the latter's refusal
to accept, brought a bill for specific performance. The bond
could be regarded as a continuing offer to sell,' 5 which offer
had been accepted by the tender of the purchase price. Had
the plaintiff not been a married woman, there would have
been after the tender an obligation on the defendant to convey the land which obligation equity would have enforced.
The fact of her being a married woman prevented her under
the laws of the state from contracting except in respect to
her separate property.18 If the money tendered Was herown, there would appear to be nO question but that she had
a right to specific performance. in that case there was
contract'bef6re the tender; but the tender was evidence of the
acceptance of the continuing offer contained in the bond. If
"Campe v. Horn, 158 Pa. 5o8 (i893), 5zr. This case, as well as the
principal case, is decided under the Married Woman's Property Act of
z887, P. L. 332, since superseded by the Act of i893, P. L. 344; P. & L.
Dig. Laws, Col. 2887, et sec.

Z219 S. W. 29 (189).
'-The
'
bond expressly stated that it was not binding on the woman

to take the land; i.e., the bond" did not recite a bilateral contract of sale
between the obligor and the obligee, but, on the contrary, expressly
negatived any such assumption: see 49 A. L.
''Rev.
Stats., Mo. (i89g), k 893, p. 308.
" See Fourth Paper, 49 A. L. R. 5o8.
"Rev. Stat., Mo. (1899), 9 4335.

. So7.
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the mqney'was not her own' there would appear to have been
no obligation either in law or equit3' resting on the defendant, because the plaintiff's right to contract was limited to
her separate property. The court, however, discussed the
case as if the contract which was sought to be enforced was
that which was entered into at the time the bond was delivered, and dismissed the plaintiff's bill on the double ground
of lack of consideration and lack of mutuality in obligation
from the fact that the plaintiff was a
and.remedy arising
17
married woman
In England, when imprisonment for debt existed, a marrJed woman was not liable to imprisonment for non-payment
of a debt even though the debt was binding on her separate
estate. In Dowling v. Maguire,' a married woman, having
contracted to purchase with her separate property right to
appoint to a benefice, sought specific performance of the
contract. The defendant raised the defence of lack of mutuality in the remedy, because of the plaintiff's immunity from
*imprisonment for debt. The court disregarded the defence.
It will be noticed that the lack of mutuality was rather in the
remedy at law than in the remedy in equity1"
Where a husband contracts to sell the land of his wife, the
court may regard the husband as acting as agent for hi1
wife; in other words, they may consider the wife as the real
contracting party. Whatever the value of this inference, i
has been made in cases where the husband, at the time of
the contract, expressly stated that the land was not his own
but his wife's. If the contract is regarded as a contract with
"In Iowa, in Chamberlin v. Robertson, 31 Ia. 4o8 (1871), Beck, J.,
who writes the opinion, treats a contract of a married woman as voidable, not void, and comes to the conclusion that, as the married woman
in thp case before him had partly performed, she could enforce. The
majority of the judges, however, regard the contract, in view of the
plaintiff's part performance, as enforceable against the plaintiff's separate
estate. It is not clear whether they regard the original contract as
voidable by the. married woman before her part performance, though
this may be inferred from Judge *Beck's statement of their position on
p. 414.
IsL. & G. Temp. Plunkett, 1 (1834).
'From the remarks of the court on p. ig,it is dqubtful whether the
exact nature of the defense was understood.
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the wife, the question arises, as in cases where a married woman has made an executory contract for the purchase
of land, is she, under any enabling statute, competent to
make such a contract? If she is not, as pointed out,
there is no contract, and of course the vendee cannot be made
to take the land, even though the husband offers a deed
signed by the wife. This result is reached in Virginia.20 In
that state, at least down to the Code of 1887, a married
woman, though she could make a good title to her separate
property, seems to have been unable to make a valid executory contract for its sale.2 ' In the first case just cited, Watts
v. Kenny, the husband of a married woman agreed to sell
land which he held in the right of his wife.- The husband
-and wife attempted to enforce the contract. The court take
the position that the "wife in this case is the essential contracting party,"'2 2 and one of the grounds for dismissing the
bill is the lack of mutuality arising from the fact. that the
woman was not bound. As in the other cases which we have
discussed, this appears to be only an unfortunate way of saying that there was no contract. In Chilowe Iron Company
v. Gardnerthe court again regarded an agreement by a husband to sell his wife's land as failing to create contractual
obligations between the pairties. In the last case cited,
Cheatham v. Cheatham, the husband and wife both entered
into the contract of sale. In this case, therefore, there is
more reason for regarding the contract as with the wife, and
c6nsequently void. Here too it "is
made plain that the court
jbelieve that the agreement is not binding on either party.23
"Watts v. Kenney, 3 Leigh 272, Va. (1831), 29I; Chilowie Iron
Company v. Gardner, 79 Va. 305 (1884), 311; Cheatham v. Cheatham,
81 Va. 395 (1886), 403.
' If she conveyed she could enforce payment or any other covenant of
the vendee: Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co. v. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346 (1889).

2!P. 29o.
'Pp. 51o-511. The fact that a married woman in Virgiriia, at the
time these last two cases were decided, could not make a valid contract
for the sale of her separate real property seems extraordinary, in-view of
the language of the Act of 1877, as amended by the Act of 1878. The
statute mentioned provides that a married woman in relation to her
separate property shall have "the power to contract in relation thereto,
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In criticism of these Virginia decisions, it may be pointed
out that where one agrees to sell his wife's land; 'the' infeience that she is the contracting party is,' to say' the least,'
strained.. On its face the. contract is with the husband, and
unless the wife also signs the contract of sale, with no one
but the husband. When the husband offers a deed signed
by his wife he fulfills his contract to give a good title to the
land. Under this conception, at the time the contract is
made there is nolack of mutuality in the obligation of the
parties; there is, however, a lack of mutuality in the remedy.
The husband, not having a good title nor the legal power
to obtain one, cannot be made to convey. On the other hand,
when he brings his bill he is able to offer a good title. The
question raised is identical with that which always arises
when the vendor, who has no title at the time of the contract, acquires a title before the time for conveyance, which
or for the disposal thereof . . ." See Burk's Notes on the
Property Rights of Married Women in Virginia, ed. 1893, p. 76. Yet
in Cheatham v. Cheatham the court, quoting from Professor Minor,
say: "That if the husband and wife agreed to sell and convey the wife's
land, the agreement cannot be specifically enforced against either of
them; not against the wife, because she is incapable of binding herself
by any' executliry contract . . ."
See pp. 4o2, 4o3. See also
Burk's Notes, pp. 23-25. The explanation may be that the comma after
the word "thereto," in the sentence quoted from the Act, makes the
Act read: That a married woman has the right to make contracts in
relation to her separate estate, and has the right to dispose of her
separate estate; but that the word, "contracts," and consequently the
power to contract, is confined to "contracts" in relation to her separate
estate; and that the words, "in relation to," have a technical meaning
which does not include sale, but only contracts in relation to the
improvement, and contracts on the faith of, the separate estate. The
text of Minor quoted by the court was written in 1875, that is before
the statute. It is repeated in an edition published after the statute:
Minor's nstitutes, Vol. I, 3d ed. (1882), p. 344. This edition also contains a criticism on the Act of 1877, and indeed on all modern legislation
concerning the status of married women: ib., p. 346, et sec. The court
may have been in sympathy with the 'criticism.
It would appear that there ought not to be any doubt but that,,
under the present Code of Virginia a married woman can make an
executory contract for the sale of her lands. The Code of 1887, § 2888,
says: "She may make contracts, as if sole, in respect to trade, etc.,
and her said separate estate.

.

.
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good title he asks the purchaser to take. As we will see in
a subsequent paper, the defence of lack of mutuality cannot
be successfully raised in such a case. On this theory, therefore, the husband who contracts to sell the land of his wife
can have specific performance, provided his wife will put him
into a position to offer a good title. There are several cases
in which the courts adopt this view. 24

In two cases, one in

Iowa and one in New Jersey,25 the court regarded the contract as with the husband, and yet refused specific performance at his instance, though he offered a good deed, on the
express ground of want of mutuality in the remedy. In
both cases the court ignored the doctrine that if the vendor
offers a good title at the time the bill is brought, the defence
of lack of mutuality does not apply. It is curious also to note
that the court ifi the Iowa case, Luse v. Deitz, rely on Bromley v. Jeffiries and Lawrenson v. Butler both of which
have, as I have pointed out in a previous paper, nothing to
do with lack of mutuality in the remedy.28 The New Jersey
case relies on Lawrenson v. Butler and cases following
that case in this country, but particularly on the case of
Luse v. Deitz itself.
When a married man agrees to sell his own and, and in
accordance with this contract offers a deedArigned by his
wife, which is refused, there is, if the vendor proceeds in
equity, a want of mutuality in the remedy... The married
woman could not have been forced to join her husband in
the conveyance and sign away her right of dower. But here
again the plaintiff has obtained a good title before bringing
his bill, and the original want of mutuality in the remedy is
disregarded. Indeed, there would be even less reason for
allowing the defence of want of mutuality in the remedy to
prevail in such a case than when the woman is the owner of
the land at the time of the agreement with her husband. For,
where a married woman, having an inchoate right-of dower
in her husband's lands, refuses to join with him in a convey"4Logan v. Bull, 78 Ky. 6o7'(i88o) ; Dressel v. Jordan, 1O4 Mass. 407
(i87o). See also Sinith v. Cansler,83 Ky. 367 (1885), 371.
' Luse v. Deitz, 46 Ia. 2o5 (i8772,; Ten Ecyk v. Manning, 52 N. J. Eq.
47 (893).

=2 Vern.415

(I700) ; i Sch. & Lef. 13 (i8o2) ; A, L. R. 270.
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ance of the land, the defect in the vendor's title is comparatively slight, and the vendee can, in most jurisdictiom, force
him to convey his own interest
with compensation for failure
27
t6 convey his wife's interest.
There is an impression that in the eighteenth century the
Court of Chancery; while they would not issue a decree
against a married woman, would order the husband to fulfill
his contract of sale by procuring the joinder of his wife. If
this impression is correct, then, even had the doctrine of lack
of mutuality in the remedy as a defence to specific performance existed, which it did not, it would not have applied to
contracts with married men for the sale of land. But as will
be seen from the note on these decrees, the extent of this doctrine has been exaggerated. If the purchase money had not
been paid by the vendee he could not obtain such a decree,
and therefore if the vend& offered a conveyance and demanded the purchase money, there would have been ground
for the contention of a defendant, who was asked to fulfil a
contract with a married man for the purchase of real property, that the defence of want
of mutuality in the remedy
28
should be applied to his case.
"This subject, which is part of the larger subject of the partial specific performance of contracts, will be treated in the June number.
NoTE: ON DECREES AGAINST A MARRIED MAN TO COMPEL HIS WIFE
TO JOIN IN A CONVEYANCE.

In Voux v. Gleas, 4 & 5 Edw. 6 fo. 35, 1552, reported in Toth. (ed.
the fact that a husband was bound to exercise his control over
his wife in order to compel her to perform what the court considered
her legal obligation is recognized. It was there ordered that he enter
into a recognizance "that his wife shall release her right." See also
where a man was bound to see that his wife brouiht in "certain evidences." Kings College v. Ragland, 4 Eliz. li. A. fo. 73, X561, cited,
Toth. (ed. i82o) io6. So also in GriWn v. Tailor, 1629, reported in
Toth. (ed. i82o) io6, the Court of Chancery ordered a man to procure
his wife to aclmowledge a fine. These cases are all cited in 4 Vin.
i82o) 92,

Abr. 2o3, pl I, 2 r 3 . It is probable from the remarks in Otread v. Round,

4 Vin. Abr. 2o3, pl. 4, that the Chancery case of Griffin v. Tailor was one
for the specific performance, of a contract by the husband and wife to
sell the wife's land, and that the wife still persisting in her refusal, the
husband went to jail for contempt. An early and unquestioned
reported expression by a Court of Chancery of a wife's obligations to fulfill a contract made by her husband is found
in Baker v. Child,.2 Vern. 61 (1688). The entire, report of the case is
contained in a single sentence, as follows: "Where a feme covert, by
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The third class of dependent persons are lunatics. The
contract of a lunatic is void. No quesion, therefore, of the
specific performance of such contracts can arise. But where
agreement made with her husband, is to surrender, or levy a fine, though
the husband died before it be done, the court will by decree compel the
woman to perform the agreement." The case of Barrington v. Horn,
2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 17 (1714); s.c. 5 Vin. Abr. 547, pl. 35, is the first
reported case in which a decree against a husband directed him to procure the joinder of his wife. There the husband covenanted to levy a
fine and procure his wife to join, and the court "Decreed that the husband the defendant should procure his wife to join with him in a fine
to the plaintiff according to his covenant, since he has taken- upon him
to do it, and the plaintiff has paid the"full value of the estate." Four
years afterwards in Otread v. Round, 4 Vin. Abr. 203, pl. 4 (718) (also
called Outram v. Round), where a husband and wife conveyed by lease
and release the wife's land, and covenanted that the wife should levy a
fine of the same to the use of the purchaser, the court refused to decree
the husband to compel his wife to do.-so. As stated, tle court apparently refer to Griffln v. Tailor as a similar case and disapprove of the
action of the court. No mention is made of Barringtonv. Horn. It will
be noticed that there are two differences between the cases. In Otread
v.Round it is the wife's land; again, the contract has in no wise been
executed by the purchaser. The case of Winter v. Devereux (1723),
referred to in 3 P. Wmn. I8g, note B, seems to have been a similar case
to Barringtonv. Horn. There, however, the Master of the Rolls is said
by the reporter Williams to have suggested another reason for the
decree; namely, that in all cases it is to be presumed that the husband,
where he covenants that his wife shall levy a fine, hath first gained her
consent for that purpose. In Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Win. 187 (1733), a
decree, as in Barringtonv. Horn was procured against the husband, the
court saying, "There have been a hundred precedents." It is doubtful
if the "hundred precedents" existed, as Chief Baron Gilbert, writing in
1756, intimates a doubt as to the propriety of such decrees: See Forum
Romanum, p. 245. The reporter Williams, writing in x749, in the same
note to which we have before referred, 38 Win. i89, note B, suggests
that a decree would not be granted where it was impossible for the husband to procure the joinder of his wife; adding that this would be
especially so in a case, "where the husband offered to return all the
money, with interest and costs, and to answer all damages.", The case
s.upposed by the reporter had already occurred. In Otread v. Round,
4 Vin. Abr. 2o3, pl. 4, 2o3 (1817), Lord Cowper had, as we have seen,
already refused specific performance in such a case; and later a similar
action was taken in Daniel v. Adams, Amb. 495 (Ic764), a case where
there was evidence that the contract had been made without the wife's
authority, and none of the purchase money had been received by the
husband. In this last case the court said, that Barrington v. Horn and
Hall v. Hardy proceeded on the.ground of fraud, as in those cases the
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a person of sound mind enters into a contract and then
becomes insane, there is a good contract; the trouble is with
its enforcement. A Court of Chancery cannot make a decree
purchase money had been received; adding that, 'where the wife is
bound she must have done something to confirm the agreement or receive
some benefit from it." It may be presumed that payment of the purchase money to the husband would be a benefit to her within the meaning of the sentence quoted. Within these limitations, however, in the
latter part of the eighteenth century, the doctrine was well established,
that a court would decree a husband to procure his wife to join with him
in a conveyance, where he had made a covenant to that effect, provided
some of the purchase money had been paid by the plaintiff, and provided the defendant did not offer to return this money. Though positive proof of the wife's refusal to join in the deed would probably have
prevented the court from issuing a decree, in the absence of evidence
her consent to the original contract would be presumed. Barrington v.
Horn was followed .in Withers v. Purchard (1795), a case referred to
in 7 Ves. 475.
With the beginning of the nineteenth century the idea of ordering a
husband to procure his wife to join in a deed received severe criticism.
In i8o2 Sir James Mansfield, in a case at law, David v. Jones, 5 Bos. &
Pul. 267, said: "The covenant upon which this action is brought is
such as the Court of Chancery would not now enforce, and indeed nothing can be more absurd than to allow a married woman to be compelled
to levy a fine, through the fear of her husband being sued and thrown
into gaol, when the general principle of law is, that a married woman
shall not be compelled to levy a fine." Yet in the same year Sir William
Grant, in Morris v. Stephenson, 7 Ves. 474 (i8o2), issued such a decree,
though he was careful to lay emphasis on the fact that in the case before
him the plaintiff could not be restored to his original position and the
defendant did not allege that he could not procure the joinder of his
wife. P. 478.
It is probable that the doubts of Lord Eldon, expressed in Emery v.
Wase, 8 Ves. 505 (i8o3), really caused the practice of issuing these
decrees to fall into desuetde. In that case a married man and his
daughter agreed to sell land to A. at the valuation of C. C. valued, and
A. brought his bill for specifi performance of the award, asking that his
wife join. The bill was dismissed. Lord Eldon confirmed this dismissal
on the ground that there was evidence that C. had performed his duties
carelessly. He also discussed decrees against married men to procure
their wives to join. Speaking of the alleged presumption that the contract was entered into with the wife's consent, he says: "If this was
perfectly res'integra,I should hesitate long before I should say the
husband is to be understood to have gained her consent, and the presumption is to be made that he obtained it before the bargain, to avoid all
the fraud, that may be afterwards practiced to procure it." Pp. 514, 515.
He also states that the argument shows the whole question of these
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against a lunatic. 29 The court acts in personam. The
inability of the court to grant full relief to the puichaser of
land whose vendor has, since the purchase, become insane, is
illustrated by the case of Hall v. Warren.80 There the defendant contracted to sell his land to the plaintiff, but before the
bill was brought he became deranged. The court directed an
issue to be tried, whether the defendant was sound at the time
he entered into the alleged contract. Sir William Grant says,
decrees, "not quite so well settled as it has been understood to be." P.
514. The argument which was destined to do away with the practice
had been made by Romilly, with a Mr. Lloyd. P. 5io. It was not correct to say that there was a conflict in the cases. As I have tried to
show those cases in which the decree was denied merely tended to limit
the granting of the decree to cases in which the purchase money had been
paid, and there was no evidence that the wife refused to join. Though
the opinion in Etnery v. Wase seems to have been the deciding influe nce which ended the practice of issuing these decrees, the point was
not decided by Lord Eldon, and it is characteristic of that judge, that
several years afterwards, in Innes v. Jackson, i6 Ves. 356 (18og), he
intimates that if it was necessary "upon a principle of a certain class:
of cases, perhaps this court would have decreed the husband to procure his wife to join in levying a fine." P. 367. This, however, seems
to be the last intimation that the court might issue such a decree. Howet
v. George, i Mad. i,a case decided in iSs, involved the question
whether a man can be decreed to procure his wife and son to join in a
recovery. Vice-Chancellor Pfumer says that the matter was not much
pressed in'argument, and adds: "It could not be argued that a man
should be compelled to use his marital and parental authority to compel
his wife and son to do acts which ought only to be spontaneously done.'"
He cites Sir James Mansfield and Lord Eldon's criticism on the old
cases with approval; but at the same time he takes care to point out
that in the case before him the court is asked to make the father use
his parental authority over the son, and that even the eighteenth century
cases have not gone so far. I know of no further mention of the doctrine until the case of Fenelly v. Anderson, z Ir. Ch.'7O6 (i85I). There
the court referred to the power, once existing in a Court of Chancery,
to compel a husband to procure his wife to join in a fine; aading that
the power no longer exists. This has been the universal assumption ever
since.
" The case of Owen v. Davies, i Ves. Sr. 82 (747), is not contrary
to this statement. There the vendor, after entering into a contract for
the sale of his land, became a lunatic; but the legal title to the land was
in trustees, and therefore it was not necessary for the court to make an
order against the lunatic in order tc vest a good title in the purchaser.
W9 Ves. 6o5 (1804).

DEFENCE OF LACK OF MUTUALITY.

that provided the contract was made when the defendant
was of sound mind, he does not see why the plaintiff is not
entitled to all the court can give him, which is the right to
enjoy the land during the life of the lunatic.3 ' On the death
of the lunatic the plaintiff could, we may suppose, compel
the heir to convey the land.3 2 When, therefore, there is no
power conferred on the court by statute over the real property of lunatics, if the committee of the lunatic attempt to
enforce a contract for the sale of land entered into by the
lunatic before he becomes deranged, there would appear, to
be a want of mutuality in the remedy. So far as the writer
is aware, the question of want of mutuality in the remedy
in such cases has never arisen, nor is it likely to arise, as it
is usual to find that the powers of the Court of Chancery
have been extended, so as to enable the court to vest a good
title in a vendee of land, where, since the contract of sale, the
vendor 'has become insane.3 8 Should the question arise,
however, we believe there would be a tendency to-disregard
the defence of want of mutuality, at least in the United
States; in other words, that, as in the care of the infant
plaintiff, the tendency to protect dependent persons would1
prove stronger than the belief that there should -be mutliality of remedy in equity.3 4
William DraperLPwis.
1P.612.
" See the order in Pegge v. Skynner, x Cox Eq.
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(1784), which was

a bill for specific performance of a contract where one of the lessors
had become a lunatic. Lord Thurlow ordered: "That the defendant
Skynner should execute a counterpart of a lease, and also the defendant
Richardson
(the lunatic), when he should be capable of so doing."
. It is incorrect
therefore to say, as the court dial in Yauger v. Skinner,
14 N. J. Eq. 389 (862), p. 395, "that the purchaser may enforce the
completion of the contract by a bill fo specific performance; for in New
Jersey at that time there does not seem to have been any statute author-'
izing the committee of the lunatic to make a good title to his lands ekcept
in the case of a sale to pay debts for maintenance. See P. L. (1852),
p. 91. Even at the present time it is apparently doubtful whether-the
lunatic's committee can be authorized to sell land in fulfillment of a contract of sale made by the lunatic before he became insane: Gen. Stati.
N. J.(1895), p. 17Or, § 26; P. L. (1885), p. 30. The case of Yauger v.
Skinner did not involve the question.
For' examples of these statutes see: 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, § 122;
P. & L. Dig. Laws Penna. (1894), Col. 2826, § 53.
"See supra, p. 252.

